THE most urgent problems of our world today are the problems we have made for ourselves. They have not been caused by some heedless or malicious inanimate Nature, nor have they been imposed on us as punishment by the will of God. They are human problems whose solutions will require us to change our behavior and our social institutions.

As a science directly concerned with behavioral and social processes, psychology might be expected to provide intellectual leadership in the search for new and better personal and social arrangements. In fact, however, we psychologists have contributed relatively little of real importance -even less than our rather modest understanding of behavior might justify. We should have contributed more; although our scientific base for valid contributions is far from comprehensive, certainly more is known than has been used intelligently.

This is the social challenge that psychologists face. In the years immediately ahead we must not only extend and deepen our understanding of mental and behavioral phenomena, but we must somehow incorporate our hard-won knowledge more effectively into the vast social changes that we all know are coming. It is both important and appropriate for us, on occasions such as this, to consider how best to meet this social challenge.

In opening such a discussion, however, we should keep clearly in mind that society has not commissioned us to cure its ills; a challenge is not a mandate. Moreover, there is nothing in the definition of psychology that dedicates our science to the solution of social problems. Our inability to solve the pressing problems of the day cannot be interpreted as an indictment of the scientific validity of our psychological theories. As scientists we are obliged to communicate what we know, but we have no special obligation to solve social problems.

Our obligations as citizens, however, are considerably broader than our obligations as scientists. When psychological issues are raised in this broader context, we cannot evade them by complaining that they are unscientific. If we have something of practical value to contribute, we should make every effort to insure that it is implemented.

I believe that the majority of American psychologists have accepted this broader interpretation of our responsibilities and have been eagerperhaps, sometimes, overly eager-to apply our science to social problems. We have not been aloof or insensitive; the bulk of our profession works full time on exactly such problems. And I do not wish to discount the many and often successful efforts toward application that we have made already. Yet I cannot escape the impression that we have been less effective than we might have been. "Why" and "what more might be done" are questions that have troubled me increasingly in recent years.

First, however, I would like to raise a somewhat parochial question.

Role of The American Psychological Association

If we accept this challenge to use psychology to solve social problems, what role should we expect the American Psychological Association to play? I raise this question because my experience as an officer of APA has taught me that many of our members look to their national organization for leadership in insuring that our scientific and professional activities have greater social relevance.

Psychologists have been well represented among those who sign petitions of political protest (Ladd, 1969), and they have not failed to make their opinions heard in their own national headquarters. Scarcely a meeting of the Board of Directors in recent years has not featured one or more petitions from concerned members, committees, boards, divisions, or state associations requesting some action related to public affairs. These matters range all the way from the proper use of psychological tests, where APA usually has something to say, to the endorsement of particular political candidates, where APA usually does not.

These demands have imposed considerable strain on the Association, which was not created to be an instrument for social action and which responds hesitantly to any suggestion that it should become something more than a scientific and professional organization. But it does respond. I was surprised to discover how seriously Al'A regards any legitimate request from its membership, and how sensitive it is to the social implications of its actions, policies, and communications. Some members wish APA would do more, some less. On balance, I think APA has reflected reasonably accurately the general consensus of its members with respect to its role in public affairs.

It is not my intention to raise here any of the specific issues of public policy that have concerned the Board of Directors and the Council of Representatives, or even to offer a general formula for deciding what the public role of the APA should be. Procedurally, I am willing to stand on the thoughtful recommendations of the ad hoc Committee on Public Aflairs (Tyler, 1969).

A point of general interest, however, and one that relates more directly to the theme I wish 1o discuss, is the frequently heard argument that APA should take some action or other because the first article of our Bylaws states that the Association shall have as its object to promote human welfare, a goal that is echoed in our statement of the Ethical Standards of Psychologists.

This argument is usually made by those who recommend that APA should publicly advocate some particular social reform. When these recommendations are appropriate, the action is adopted the necessary letters are written, public statements are released to the press, etc. But not every recommendation is acceptable. It has been my impression that the less related the issue is to the scientific and professional interests of our membership, the greater is the likelihood that the promotion of human welfare will be invoked in the course of the discussion.

In most cases this argument has not persuaded me; I have traced my skepticism to two sources.

First, even the most cursory study of welfare economics will show that human welfare has never been operationally defined as a social concept. If there is such a thing as human welfare in the general sense, it must be some kind of weighted average. In difficult cases, where disagreement is most probable, something that advances the welfare of one group may disadvantage another group. The problem is to decide whose welfare we wish to promote. The APA is committed to advancing the welfare of psychologists, of course, but we dare not assume blindly that whatever is good for psychology must always be good for humanity.

Vague appeals to human welfare seldom answer specific questions because we seldom have sufficient information to decide which actions will have the desired result. And even when we do have sufficient wisdom to know in advance which actions will promote human welfare most effectively, we still face the ethical question of whether such actions are morally permissible.

My first reason for distrusting appeals to human welfare, therefore, is that they do little to clarify the logical, informational, or ethical bases for making difficult decisions. Something more is required than a sincere declaration that our heart is in the right place.

My second reason has to do with the fact that the phrase is usually quoted out of context. At the risk of losing your attention, therefore, I would like to state Article I of our Bylaws in full:

The objects of the American Psychological Association shall be to advance psychology as a science and as a means of promoting human welfare by the encouragement of psychology in all its branches in the broadest and most liberal manner; by the promotion of research in psychology and the improvement of research methods and conditions; by the improvement of the qualifications and usefulness of psychologists through high standards of professional ethics, conduct, education, and achievement; by the increase and diffusion of psychological knowledge through meetings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions, and publications; therchy to advance scientific interests and inquiry, and the application of research findings to the promotion of the public welfare [APA, 1968, xill].

As I understand Article I, our corporate aim is to promote psychology. We justify that aim by our belief that psychology can be used for the public good. I do not understand Article I as a general license to endorse social actions or positions, however meritorious on other grounds, that do not advance psychology as a science and as a means of promoting human welfare. The APA is our own creature, of course; we can change our Bylaws any way we like. As presently conceived, however, APA does not have a charter to intervene on behalf of every good cause that comes along.

There are many things of social value that APA can do, and many that it has already done. If your officers have not always seemed hungry for innovation, eager to reshape APA to meet every new social issue, they have certainly been open to constructive change within the scope of our charter. I believe they have reflected the wishes of the bulk of the membership, and I feel no need to apologize for what has been accomplished. The APA has been doing what its membership wanted to do, and doing it rather well.

Of course, the membership has been far from unanimous in these matters. For example, there has been a running debate in recent years concerning the proper role for individual psychologists to play in the initiation of social reforms. We have been divided as to whether psychologists should remain expert advisers or should take a more active, participatory responsibility for determining public policy. An adviser is expected to summarize the arguments pro and con, but to leave the policy decisions to others; a participant wants to make the policy decisions himself.

Those who favor more active participation by individual psychologists tend to argue that APA should also become directly involved in advocating particular social policies. This whole debate seems to presuppose, however, that social reforms can occur only as a result of policy decisions by government or industry. This presupposition should not go unchallenged. Perhaps our options for promoting human welfare are broader than this debate would suggest.

It was E. G. Boring who first impressed on me the importance of a clear distinction between Psychology with a capital I and psychology with a small p. Capital-l' Psychology refers to our associations, departments, laboratories, and the like. Small-p psychology refers to the discipline itself. Capital-P Psychology can do little to promote human welfare, outside of its faithful promotion of small-p psychology. We should not, through impatience or bad judgment, try to use capital-P Psychology where only small-p psychology could succeed. Let us by all means do everything we can to promote human welfare, but let us not forget that our real strength in that cause will come from our scientific knowledge, not from our national Association.

In my opinion, our Association can never play more than a supporting role in the promotion of social change. I do not conclude from this that APA has become irrelevant or useless, or, even worse, that it has tacitly endorsed a political bureaucracy that presides over the inequitable distribution of health, wealth, and wisdom in our society. The fact that APA has not reformed society does not mean that it approves the status quo; it means simply that there is relatively little such an association can do. When one considers the magnitude and urgency of the problems mankind faces, the question of what positions APA takes is, after all, a minor matter.

The important question, to my mind, is not what APA is doing, but what psychologists are doing. What Psychology can do as an association depends directly on the base provided by psychology as a science. It is our science that provides our real means for promoting human welfare.

So let me turn now to broader aspects of my topic.

Revolutionary Potential of Psychology

I will begin by stating publicly something that I think psychologists all feel, but seldom talk about. In my opinion, scientific psychology is potentially one of the most revolutionary intellectual enterprises ever conceived by the mind of man. If we were ever to achieve substantial progress toward our stated aim-toward the understanding, prediction, and control of mental and behavioral phenomena-the implications for every aspect of society would make brave men tremble.

Responsible spokesmen for psychology seldom emphasize this revolutionary possibility. One reason is that the general public is all too ready lo believe it, and public resistance to psychology would be all too easy to mobilize. Faced with the possibility that revolutionary pronouncements might easily do more harm than good, a prudent spokesman finds other drums to march to.

Regardless of whether we agree that prudence is always the best policy, I believe there is another reason for our public modesty. Anyone who claims that psychology is a revolutionary enterprise will face a demand from his scientific colleagues to put up or shut up. Nothing that psychology has done so far, they will say, is very revolutionary. They will admit that psychometric lests, psychoanalysis, conditioned reflexes, sensory thresholds, implanted electrodes, and factor analysis are all quite admirable, but they can scarcely be compared 10 gunpowder, the steam engine, organic chemistry, radio-telephony, computers, atom bombs, or genetic surgery in their revolutionary consequences for society. Our enthusiastic spokesman would have to retire in confused embarrassment.

Since I know that rash statements about the revolutionary potential of psychology may lead to public rejection and scientific ridicule, why do I take such risks on this occasion? My reason is that. I do not believe the psychological revolution is still pie in the sky. It has already begun.

One reason the psychological revolution is not. more obvious may be that we have been looking for it in the wrong place. We have assumed that psychology should provide new technological options, and that a psychological revolution will not occur until someone in authority exercises those options to attain socially desirable goals. One reason for this assumption, perhaps, is that it follows the model we have inherited from previous applications of science to practical problems. An applied scientist is supposed to provide instrumentalities for modifying the environment- instrumentalities that can then, under public regulation, be used by wealthy and powerful interests to achieve certain goals. The psychological revolution, when it comes, may follow a very different course, at least in its initial stages.

Davis (1960) has explained the difference between applied social science and applied natural science in the following way:

Applied science, by definition, is instrumental. When the human goal is given, it seeks a solution by finding what effective means can be manipulated in the required way. Its function is to satisfy human desires and wants; otherwise nobody would bother. But when the science is concerned with human beings-not just as organisms but as goal-secking individuals and members of groups--then it cannot be instrumental in this way, because the object of observation has a say in what is going on and, above all, is not willing to be treated as a pure instrumentality. Most so-called social problems are problems because people want certain things or because there is a conflict of desires or interests [p. 26].

Davis goes on to argue that once conflicts of interest have developed, applied social science is helpless; that it is only when people are agreed on their goals that our information can be usefully applied.

Although I agree with Davis that behavioral and social sciences cannot be applied to people and institutions in the same way physical and biological sciences are applied to objects and organisms, I do not agree with his view that we must remain impotent in the face of conflict. We know a great deal about the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and that information could certainly be put to better use than it has been. Indeed, sometimes what is needed is not to resolve conflict but to foster it, as when entrenched interests threaten segments of the public that have no organizational identity. And there, in turn, we know a great deal about the creation of appropriate constituencies 10 defend their common interests. Behavioral and social scientists are far from helpless in such situations.

More important, however, I believe that the real impact of psychology will be felt, not through the technological products it places in the hands of powerful men, but through its effects on the public at large, through a new and different public conception of what is humanly possible and what is humanly desirable.

I believe that any broad and successful application of psychological knowledge to human problems will necessarily entail a change in our conception of ourselves and of how we live and love and work together. Instead of inventing some new technique for modifying the environment, or some new product for society to adapt itself to however it can, we are proposing to tamper with the adaptive process itself. Such an innovation is quite different from a "technological fix." I see little reason to believe that the traditional model for scientific revolutions should be appropriate.

Consider, for example, the effect that Freudian psychology has already had on Western society. It is obvious that its effects, though limited to certain segments of society, have been profound, yet I do not believe that one can argue that those effects were achieved by providing new instrumentalitics for achieving goals socially agreed upon. As a method of therapy, psychoanalysis has had limited success even for those who can afford it. It has been more successful as a method of investigation, perhaps, but even there it has been only one of several available methods. The impact of Freud's thought has been due far less to the instrumentalities he provided than to the changed conception of ourselves that he inspired. The wider range of psychological problems that Freud opened up for professional psychologists is only part of his contribution. More important in the scale of history has been his effect on the broader intellectual community and, through it, on the public at large.

Today we are much more aware of the irrational components of human nature and much better able to accept the reality of our unconscious impulses. The importance of Freudian psychology derives far less from its scientific validity than from the effects it has had on our shared image of man himself.

I realize that one might argue that changes in man's conception of himself under the impact of advances in scientific knowledge are neither novel nor revolutionary. For example, Darwin's theory changed our conception of ourselves, but not until the past decade has it been possible to mount a truly scientific revolution based on biological science. One might argue that we are now only at the Darwinian stage in psychology, and that the real psychological revolution is still a century or more in the future. I do not find this analogy appropriate, however.

To discover that we are not at the center of the universe, or that our remote ancestors lived in a tree, does indeed change our conception of man and society, but such new conceptions can have little effect on the way we behave in our daily affairs and in our institutional contexts. A new conception of man based on psychology, however, would have immediate implications for the most intimate details of our social and personal lives. This fact is unprecedented in any earlier stage of the Industrial Revolution.

The heart of the psychological revolution will be a new and scientifically based conception of man as an individual and as a social creature. When I say that the psychological revolution is already upon us, what I mean is that we have already begun to change man's self-conception. If we want to further that revolution, not only must we strengthen its scientific base, but we must also try to communicate it to our students and to the public. It is not the industrialist or the politician who should exploit it, but Everyman, every day.

The enrichment of public psychology by scientific psychology constitutes the most direct and important application of our science to the promotion of human welfare. Instead of trying to foresee new psychological products that might disrupt our existing social arrangements, therefore, we should be self-consciously analyzing the general effect that our scicntific psychology may have on popular psychology. As I try to perform this analysis for myself, I must confess that I am not altogether pleased with the results.

I would like now to consider briefly some of the effects we are having and where, in my view, our influence is leading at the present time. Let me begin with a thumbnail sketch of one major message that many scientific psychologists are trying to communicate to the public.

Control of Behavior

One of the most admired truisms of modern psychology is that some stimuli can serve to reinforce the behavior that produces them. The practical significance of this familiar principle arises from the implication that if you can control the occurrence of these reinforcing stimuli, then you can control the occurrence of adaptive behavior intended to achieve or avoid them. This contingency between behavior and its consequences has been demonstrated in many studies of animal behavior, where environmental conditions can be controlled, or at least specified, and where the results can be measured with some precision.

Something similar holds for the human animal, of course, although it is complicated by man's symbolic proclivities and by the fact that the disparity between experimenter and subject changes when the subject is also a man. Between men, reinforcement is usually a mutual relation and each person controls the other to some extent. This relation of mutual reinforcement, which man's genius for symbols has generalized in terms of money or the promise of money, provides the psychological basis for our economic system of exchange. Psychologists did not create this economic system for controlling behavior, of course. What we have tried to do is to describe its psychological basis and its limits in terms sufficiently general to hold across different species, and to suggest how the technique might be extended to educational, rehabilitative, therapeutic, or even political situations in which economic rewards and punishments would not normally be appropriate. Once a problem of behavior control has been phrased in these terms, we may then try to discover the most effective schedule of reinforcements.

My present concern has nothing to do with the validity of these ideas. I am concerned with their effect on the public at large, for it is there, if I am right, that we are most likely to achieve a psychological revolution.

In the public view, I suspect, all this talk about controlling behavior comes across as unpleasant, if not actually threatening. Freud has already established in the public mind a general belief that all behavior is motivated. The current message says that psychologists now know how to use this motivation to control what people will do. When they hear this, of course, our scientific colleagues are likely to accuse us of pscudoscientific claims; less scientific segments of the public are likely to resent what they perceive as a threat to their personal freedom. Neither reaction is completely just, but neither is completely unjustifiable.

I believe these critics see an important truth, one that a myopic concentration on techniques of behavior control may cause us to overlook. At best, control is but one component in any program for personal improvement or social reform. Changing behavior is pointless in the absence of any coherent plan for how it should be changed. It is our plan for using control that the public wants to know about. Too often, I fear, psychologists have implied that acceptable uses for behavior control are either self-evident or can be safely left to the wisdom and benevolence of powerful men. Psychologists must not surrender the planning function so easily. Humane applications of behavior control must be based on intelligent diagnosis of the personal and social problems we are trying to solve. Psychology has at least as much, probably more, to contribute to the diagnosis of personal and social problems as it has to the control of behavior.

Regardless of whether we have actually achieved new scientific techniques of behavior control that are effective with human beings, and regardless of whether control is of any value in the absence of diagnosis and planning for its use, the simple fact that so many psychologists keep talking about control is having an effect on public psychology. The average citizen is predisposed to believe it. Control has been the practical payoff from the other sciences. Control must be what psychologists are alter, too. Moreover, since science is notoriously successful, behavior control must be inevitable. Thus the layman forms an impression that control is the name of the road we are traveling, and that the experts are simply quibbling about how far down that road we have managed to go.

Closely related to this emphasis on control is the frequently repeated claim that living organisms are nothing but machines. A scientist recognizes, of course, that this claim says far more about our rapidly evolving conception of machines than it says about living organisms, but this interpretation is usually lost when the message reaches public ears. The public idea of a machine is something like an automobile, a mechanical device controlled by its operator. If people are machines, they can be driven like automobiles. The analogy is absurd, of course, but it illustrates the kind of distortion that can occur.

If the assumption that behavior control is feasible in some precise scientific sense becomes firmly rooted in public psychology, it could have unfortunate consequences, particularly if it is coupled with an assumption that control should be exercised by an industrial or bureaucratic elite. Psychologists must always respect and advocate the principle of habeas mentem--the right of a man to his own mind (Sanford, 1955). If we really did have a new scientific way to control human behavior, it would be highly immoral to let it fall into the hands of some small group of men, even if they were psychologists.

Perhaps a historical analogy would be appropriate. When the evolution of species was a new and exciting idea in biology, various social theorists took it up and interpreted it to mean that capitalistic competition, like the competition between species, was the source of all progress, so the great wealth of the new industrialists was a scientifically necessary consequence of the law of the survival of the fittest. This argument, called "social Darwinism," had unfortunate consequences, both for social science and for society generally (Hofstadter, 1944).

If the notion should now be accepted that it is a scientifically necessary consequence of the law of reinforcement that industrialists or bureaucrats must be allowed the same control over people that an experimenter has over his laboratory animals, I fear that a similar period of intolerable exploitation might ensue-if, indeed, it has not already begun.

The dangers that accompany a science of behavior control have been pointed out many times. Psychologists who study motivation scientifically are usually puzzled by this widespread apprehension that they might be successful. Control is not something invented by psychologists. Everyone is "controlled" all the time by something or other. All we want is to discover how the controls work. Once we understand that, society can use the knowledge in whatever manner seems socially advantageous. Our critics, on the other hand, want to know who will diagnose our problems, who will set our social goals, and who will administer the rewards and punishments.

All that I have tried to add to this familiar dialogue is the observation that the social dangers involved need not await the success of the scientific enterprise. Behavior control could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If people generally should come to believe in the scientific control of behavior, proponents of coercive social programs would surely exploit that belief by dressing their proposals in scientific costumes. If our new public conception of human nature is that man's behavior can be scientifically controlled by those in positions of power, governments will quickly conform to that conception. Thus, when I try to discern what direction our psychological revolution has been taking, some aspects of it disturb me deeply and lead me to question whether in the long run these developments will really promote human welfare.

This is a serious charge. If there is any truth to it, we should ask whether any other approaches are open to us.

Personally, I believe there is a better way to advertise psychology and to relate it to social problems. Reinforcement is only one of many important ideas that we have to offer. Instead of repeating constantly that reinforcement leads to control, I would prefer to emphasize that reinforcement can lead to satisfaction and competence. And I would prefer to speak of understanding and prediction as our major scientific goals.

In the space remaining, therefore, I want to try to make the case that understanding and prediction are better goals for psychology than is control-better both for psychology and for the promotion of human welfare because they lead us to think, not in terms of coercion by a powerful elite, but in terms of the diagnosis of problems and the development of programs that can enrich the lives of every citizen.

Public Psychology: Two Paradigms

It should be obvious by now that I have somewhere in the back of my mind two alternative images of what the popular conception of human nature might become under the impact of scientific advances in psychology. One of these images is unfortunate, even threatening; the other is vaguer, but full of promise. Let me try to make these ideas more concrete.

The first image is the one I have been describing. It has great appeal to an authoritarian mind, and fits well with our traditional competitive ideology based on coercion, punishment, and retribution. The fact that it represents a serious distortion of scientific psychology is exactly my point. In my opinion, we have made a mistake by trying to apply our ideas to social problems and to gain acceptance for our science within the framework of this ideology.

The second image rests on the same psychological foundation, but reflects it more accurately; it allows no compromise with our traditional social ideology. It is assumed, vaguely but optimistically, that this ideology can be modified so as to be more receptive to a truer conception of human nature. How this modification can be achieved is one of the problems we face; I believe it will not be achieved if we continue to advertise the control of behavior through reinforcement as our major contribution to the solution of social problems. I would not wish to give anyone the impression that I have formulated a well-defined social alternative, but I would at least like to open a discussion and make some suggestions.

My two images are not very different from what McGregor (1960) once called Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X is the traditional theory which holds that because people dislike work, they must be coerced, controlled, directed, and threatened with punishment before they will do it. People tolerate being directed, and many even prefer it, because they have little ambition and want to avoid responsibility. McGregor's alternative Theory Y, based on social science, holds that work is as natural as play or rest. External control and threats are not the only means for inspiring people to work. People will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which they are committed; their commitment is a function of the rewards associated with the achievement of their objectives. People can learn not only to accept but to seek responsibility. Imagination, ingenuity, and creativity are widely distributed in the population, although these intellectual potentialities are poorly utilized under the conditions of modern industrial life.

McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y evolved in the context of his studies of industrial management. They are rival theories held by industrial managers about how best to achieve their institutional goals. A somewhat broader view is needed if we are to talk about public psychology generally, and not merely the managerial manifestations of public psychology. So let me amplify McGregor's distinction by referring to the ideas of Varela, a very remarkable engincer in Montevideo, Uruguay, who uses scientific psychology in the solution of a wide range of personal and social problems.

Varela (1970, in press) contrasts two conceptions of the social nature of man. Following Kuhn's (1962) discussion of scientific revolutions, he refers to these two conceptions as "paradigms." The first paradigm is a set of assumptions on which our social institutions are presently based. The second is a contrasting paradigm based on psychological research. Let me outline them for you very briefly.

Our current social paradigm is characterized as follows: All men are created equal. Most behavior is motivated by economic competition, and conflict is inevitable. One truth underlies all controversy, and unreasonableness is best countered by facts and logic. When something goes wrong, someone is to blame, and every effort must be made to establish his guilt so that he can be punished. The guilty person is responsible for his own misbehavior and for his own rehabilitation. His teachers and supervisors are too busy to become experts in social science; their role is to devise solutions and see to it that their students or subordinates do what they are told.

For comparison, Varela offers a paradigm based on psychological research: There are large individual differences among people, both in ability and personality. Human motivation is complex and no one ever acts as he does for any single reason, but, in general, positive incentives are more effective than threats or punishments. Conflict is no more inevitable than disease and can be resolved or, still better, prevented. Time and resources for resolving social problems are strictly limited. When something goes wrong, how a person perceives the situation is more important to him than the "true facts," and he cannot reason about the situation until his irrational feelings have been toned down. Social problems are solved by correcting causes, not symptoms, and this can be done more effectively in groups than individually. Teachers and supervisors must be experts in social science because they are responsible for the cooperation and individual improvement of their students or subordinates.

No doubt other psychologists would draw the picture somewhat differently. Without reviewing the psychological evidence on which such gencralizations are based, of course, I cannot argue their validity. But I think most of you will recognize the lines of research on which McGregor's Theory Y and Varela's second paradigm are based. Moreover, these psychologically based paradigms are incompatible in several respects with the prevailing ideology of our sociely.

Here, then, is the real challenge: How can we foster a social climate in which some such new public conception of man based on psychology can take root and flourish? In my opinion, this is the proper translation of our more familiar question about how psychology might contribute to the promotion of human welfare.

I cannot pretend to have an answer to this question, even in its translated form, but I believe that part of the answer is that psychology must be practiced by nonpsychologists. We are not physicians; the secrets of our trade need not be reserved for highly trained specialists. Psychological facts should be passed out freely to all who need and can use them. And from successful applications of psychological principles the public may gain a better appreciation for the power of the new conception of man that is emerging from our science.

If we take seriously the idea of a peaceful revolution based on a new conception of human nature, our scientific results will have to be instilled in the public consciousness in a practical and usable form so that what we know can be applied by ordinary people. There simply are not enough psychologists, even including nonprofessionals, to meet every need for psychological services. The people at large will have to be their own psychologists, and make their own applications of the principles that we establish.

Of course, everyone practices psychology, just as everyone who cooks is a chemist, everyone who reads a clock is an astronomer, everyone who drives a car is an engineer. I am not suggesting any radical departure when I say that nonpsychologists must practice psychology. I am simply proposing that we should teach them to practice it better, to make use self-consciously of what we believe to be scientifically valid principles.

Our responsibility is less to assume the role of experts and try to apply psychology ourselves than to give it away to the people who really need it and that includes everyone. The practice of valid psychology by nonpsychologists will inevitably change people's conception of themselves and what they can do. When we have accomplished that, we will really have caused a psychological revolution.

How to Give Psychology Away

I am keenly aware that giving psychology away will be no simple task. In our society there are depths of resistance to psychological innovations that have to be experienced to be believed (Graziano, 1969).

Solving social problems is generally considered to be more difficult than solving scientific problems. A social problem usually involves many more independent variables, and it cannot be finally solved until society has been persuaded to adopt the solution. Many who have tried to introduce sound psychological practices into schools, clinics, hospitals, prisons, or industries have been forced to retreat in dismay. They complain, and with good reason, that they were unable to buck the "System," and often their reactions are more violent than sensible. The System, they say, refuses to change even when it does not work.

This experience has been so common that in my pessimistic moments I have been led to wonder whether anything less than complete reform is possible.

Deutsch (1969) has made an interesting case that competitive and cooperative social relationships tend to be mutually exclusive. He summarizes the result of considerable research in the following terms:

The strategy of power and the tactics of coercion, threat, and deception result from and also result in a competitive relationship. Similarly, the strategy of mutual problem solving and the tactics of persuasion, openness, and mutual enhancement elicit and also are elicited by a cooperative orientation [p. 4].

Each orientation has its own internal consistency; elements of one are not easily injected into the other.

Perhaps a similar pressure toward internal coherence lies at the root of public resistance to many of our innovative suggestions. Tt often seems that any one of our ideas taken alone is inadequate. Injected into the existing social paradigm it is either a foreign body, incompatible with the other presuppositions that shape our social institutions, or it is distorted and trivialized to fit the preexisting paradigm.

One of the most basic ideas in all the social sciences is the concept of culture. Social anthropologists have developed a conception of culture as an organic whole, in which each particular value, practice, or assumption must be understood in the context of the total system. They tell terrible tales about the consequences of introducing Western reforms into aboriginal cultures without understanding the social equilibria that would be upset.

Perhaps cultural integrity is not limited to primitive cultures, but applies also to our own society here and now. If so, then our attempts at piecemeal innovation may be doomed either to fail or to be rejected outright.

I label these thoughts pessimistic because they imply a need for drastic changes throughout the whole system, changes that could only be imposed by someone with dangerous power over the lives of others. And that, I have argued, is not the way our psychological revolution should proceed.

In my more optimistic moments, however, I recognize that you do not need complete authority over a social organization in order to reform it. The important thing is not to control the system, but to understand it. Someone who has a valid conception of the system as a whole can often introduce relatively minor changes that have extensive consequences throughout the entire organization. Lacking such a conception, worthwhile innovations may be total failures.

For example, it you institute a schedule of rewards and punishments in the psychiatric ward of a Veterans Hospital, you should not be indignant when the American Legion objects on the grounds that you cannot withhold food and clothing from veterans. It you had had a more adequate understanding of the hospital as a social system, you

would have included the interests and influence of the American Legion in your diagnosis of the problem, and you would have formulated a plan to gain their endorsement as part of your task as a social engineer. You should not demand inordinate power just because you made an inadequate diagnosis of the problem. Understanding must come first.

In my optimistic moments I am able to convince myself that understanding is attainable and that social science is already at a stage where successful applications are possible. Careful diagnosis and astute planning based on what we already know can often resolve problems that at first glance seemed insurmountable. Many social, clinical, and industrial psychologists have already demonstrated the power of diagnosis and planning based on sound psychological principles.

Varela has illustrated such applications by his work in Uruguay. Diagnosis involves not only a detailed analysis of the social organization and of the perceptions and goals of all the people caught up in the problem, but also the description of their abilities and personalities. Planning involves the explicit formulation of a series of steps that will lead these people to consider the problem together and will help them to discover a solution that respects everyone's hopes and aspirations. If, in the course of this plan, it becomes necessary to persuade someone, this is not to be accomplished by coercion or by marshaling facts, but by a gradual, step-by-step process that enables him to reduce his reactance little by little as he convinces himself of the virtues of the alternative view and broadens his conception of the range of acceptable solutions (Zimbardo & Ebbeson, 1969, pp. 114. 121). This is not the place and I am not the person to describe the ingenuity with which Varela has constructed such plans and carried them out, but such applications give me some reason for optimism.

Diagnosing practical problems and developing detailed plans to deal with them may or may not be more difficult than solving scientific problems, but it is certainly different. Many psychologists, trained in an empiricist, experimental tradition, have tried to serve two masters at once. That is to say, they have tried to solve practical problems and simultaneously to collect data of scientific value on the effects of their interventions. Other fields, however, maintain a more equitable division of labor between scientist and engineer. Scientists are responsible for the validity of the principles; engineers accept them and try to use them to solve practical problems.

Although I recognize the importance of evaluating an engineer's product, in this domain it is no easy thing to do. Assessing social innovations is a whole art in itself, one that we are only beginning 1o develop. Economic considerations are relevant, of course, but we must also learn to evaluate the subtler psychological and social implications of our new solutions (Bauer, 1960). Technological assessment in this sense will not be achieved by insisting that every reform should resemble a well designed experiment. In particular, the need for assessment should not be allowed to discourage those who enjoy and have a talent for social engineering.

We are in serious need of many more psychological technologists who can apply our science to the personal and social problems of the general public, for it is through them that the public will eventually discover the new paradigm that psychologists are developing. That is to say, it is through the success of such practical applications that we have our best hope for revolutionizing public psychology.

Obviously, we must avoid the evils of superficiality; we must continue as scientists to refine, clarify, and integrate our new paradigm. Most importantly, we must self-consciously recognize that it is a new and revolutionary conception that we are working toward, so that isolated discoveries can be related to and evaluated in terms of that larger context. But all that would be futile, of course, if the general public did not accept it, or if public psychology were not altered by it.

There is no possibility of legislating the changes I have in mind. Passing laws that people must change their conceptions of themselves and others is precisely the opposite of what we need. Education would seem to be our only possibility. I do not mean only education in the schoolroom, although that is probably the best communication channel presently at our disposal. I have in mind a more ambitious program of educating the general public.

It is critically important to shape this education to fit the perceived needs of the people who receive it. Lectures suitable for graduate seminars are seldom suitable for laymen, and for a layman facing a concrete problem they are usually worse than useless. In order to get a factory supervisor or a ghetto mother involved, we must give them something they can use. Abstract theories, however elegant, or sensitivity training, however insightful, are too remote from the specific troubles they face.

In order to get started, we must begin with people where they are, not assume we know where they should be. If a supervisor is having trouble with his men, perhaps we should teach him how to write a job description and how to evaluate the abilities and personalities of those who fill the job; perhaps we should teach him the art of persuasion, or the time and place for positive reinforcement.

If a ghetto mother is not giving her children sufficient intellectual challenge, perhaps we should teach her how to encourage their motor, perceptual, and linguistic skills. The techniques involved arc not some esoteric branch of witchcraft that must be reserved for those with PhD degrees in psychology. When the ideas are made sufficiently concrete and explicit, the scientific foundations of psychology can be grasped by sixth-grade children.

There are many obvious and useful suggestions that we could make and that nonpsychologists could exploit. Not every psychological problem in human engineering has to be solved by a professional psychologist; engineers can rapidly assimilate psychological facts and theories that are relevant to their own work. Not every teaching program has to be written by a learning theorist; principles governing the design and evaluation of programmed materials can be learned by content specialists. Not every personnel decision has to be made by a psychometrician; not every interview has to be conducted by a clinical psychologist; not every problem has to be solved by a cognitive psychologist; not every reinforcement has to be supervised by a student of conditioning. Psychological principles and techniques can be usefully applied by everyone. If our suggestions actually work, people should be eager to learn more. If they do not work, we should improve them. But we should not try to give people something whose value they cannot recognize, then complain when they do not return for a second meeting.

Consider the teaching of reading, for example. Here is an obviously appropriate area for the application of psychological principles. So what do we do? We assemble experts who decide what words children know, and in what order they should learn to read them; then we write stories with those words and teachers make the children read them, or we use them in programmed instruction that exploits the principles of reinforcement. But all too often the children fail to recognize the value of learning these carefully constructed lessons.

Personally, I have been much impressed with the approach of Ashton-Warner (1963), who begins by asking a child what words he wants. Mummy, daddy, kiss, frightened, ghost, their own names— these are the words children ask for, words that are bound up with their own loves and fears. She writes each child's word on a large, tough card and gives it to him. If a child wants words like police, butcher, knife, kill, jail, and bomb, he gets them. And he learns to read them almost immediately. It is his word, and each morning he retrieves his own words from the pile collected cach night by the teacher. These are not dead words of an expert's choosing, but words that live in a child's own experience. Given this start, children begin to write, using their own words, and from there the teaching of reading follows naturally. Under this regimen, a word is not an imposed task to be learned with reinforcements borrowed from some external source of motivation. Learning the word is itself reinforcing; it gives the child something he wants, a new way to cope with a desire or fear. Each child decides where he wants to start, and each child receives something whose value he can recognize.

Could we generalize this technique discovered by an inspired teacher in a small New Zealand school? In my own thinking I have linked it with something that White (1959) has called competence motivation. In order to tap this motivational system we must use psychology to give people skills that will satisfy their urge to feel more effective. Feeling effective is a very personal thing, for it must be a feeling of effectiveness in coping with personal problems in one's own life. From that beginning some might want to learn more about the science that helped them increase their competence, and then perhaps we could afford to be more abstract. But in the beginning we must try to diagnose and solve the problems people think they have, not the problems we experts think they ought to have, and we must learn to understand those problems in the social and institutional contexts that define them. With this approach we might do something practical for nurses, policemen, prison guards, salesmen for people in many different walks of life. That, I believe, is what we should mean when we talk about applying psychology to the promotion of human welfare.

If you tell me that such a program is too ambitious or too foreign to our conception of ourselves as scientists and practitioners, I must agree that I do not know where to place our fulcrum to move the world. My goal is to persuade you that this is the problem we face, and that we dare not leave it for bureaucrats or businessmen to solve. We will have to cope with it however we can, and I hope that someone has better ideas than I about how to do it.

I can see some promise for innovations in parlicular subcultures. If we apply our new paradigm in particular institutions-in schools, hospitals, prisons, industries--we can perhaps test its validity and demonstrate its superiority. Many such social experiments are already in progress, of course. And much of the recent surge of interest in community psychology (Bennett, 1966) has been stimulated by the realization that we really do have something to contribute to community life. Perhaps all this work will eventually have a cumulative effect.

One trouble, of course, is that we are trying to reverse the natural direction of influence. Ordinarily, an institution or a community models its own subculture more or less automatically after the larger culture in which it is embedded, and new members require little indoctrination in order to understand the tacit assumptions on which the institution is based. Whether the new paradigm will be powerful enough to reverse this direction is, I suppose, a matter for pure speculation at the present time. It seems unlikely that we will succeed, however, if each application of the new paradigm is viewed as unrelated to every other, and no attempt is made to integrate these experiments into a paradigm for society as a whole.

It is possible, however, that our society may not be quite as resistant as we anticipate. The demand for social relevance that we have been voicing as psychologists is only one aspect of a general dissatisfaction with the current state of our society. On every hand we hear complaints about the old paradigm. People are growing increasingly alienated from a society in which a few wise men behind closed doors decide what is good for everyone.

Our system of justice based on punishment and retribution is not working. Even those most blessed by economic rewards are asking for something more satisfying to fill their lives. We desperately need techniques for resolving conflicts, and for preventing them from becoming public confrontations from which reasonable retreat is impossible. Anyone who reads the newspapers must realize that vast social changes are in the making, that they must occur if civilized society is to survive.

Vested interests will oppose these changes, of course, but as someone once said, vested interests, however powerful, cannot withstand the gradual encroachment of new ideas. If we psychologists are ready for it, we may be able to contribute a coherent and workable philosophy, based on the science of psychology, that will make this general agitation less negative, that will make it a positive search for something new.

I recognize that many of you will note these ambitions as little more than empty rhetoric. Psychologists will never be up to it, you will say. We should stay in our laboratories and do our own thing. The public will work out its own paradigms without us. Perhaps such skepticism is justified.

On the other hand, difficulty is no excuse for surrender. There is a sense in which the unattainable is the best goal to pursue. So let us continue our struggle to advance psychology as a means of promoting human welfare, each in our own way. For myself, however, I can imagine nothing we could do that would be more relevant to human welfare, and nothing that could pose a greater challenge to the next generation of psychologists, than to discover how best to give psychology away.

中文

当今世界最紧迫的问题，正是我们亲手为自己制造的问题。这些困境并非源于某种漠然或恶意的无生命自然力量，也不是上帝意志强加给我们的惩罚。它们本质上是人类自身的问题，而解决之道需要我们改变自己的行为方式和社会制度。

作为一门直接关注行为和社会过程的科学，心理学理应在寻求新的、更好的个人和社会安排方面提供智识上的引领。然而事实上，我们心理学家所贡献的真正重要的东西相对微薄——甚至比我们对行为相当有限的理解所能证明的还要少。我们本应该贡献更多；尽管我们做出有效贡献的科学基础远非全面，但已知的知识确实比被明智运用的要多得多。

这就是心理学家面临的社会挑战。在即将到来的岁月里，我们不仅必须拓展和深化对心理和行为现象的理解，还必须以某种方式将我们来之不易的知识更有效地融入到我们都知道即将到来的巨大社会变革中。对我们而言，在这样的场合思考如何最好地迎接这一社会挑战，既重要又恰当。

然而，在开启这样的讨论时，我们应该清楚地记住，社会并没有委托我们去治愈它的弊病；挑战并不等同于使命。此外，心理学的定义中并没有任何内容将我们的科学奉献给社会问题的解决。我们无法解决当今紧迫问题这一事实，不能被解读为对我们心理学理论科学有效性的控诉。作为科学家，我们有义务传达我们所知的，但我们没有解决社会问题的特殊义务。

然而，作为公民，我们的义务比作为科学家的义务要广泛得多。当心理学议题在这种更广阔的语境中被提出时，我们不能通过抱怨它们不够科学来回避。如果我们有实用价值的东西可以贡献，我们就应该尽一切努力确保它得到实施。

我相信大多数美国心理学家已经接受了对我们责任的这种更广泛的诠释，并且一直渴望——也许有时过于渴望——将我们的科学应用于社会问题。我们并非冷漠或麻木不仁；我们专业的大部分人员正全职致力于解决这些问题。我也不想贬低我们已经做出的许多往往成功的应用努力。然而，我无法摆脱这样的印象：我们本可以更加有效。"为什么"以及"还能做些什么"这些问题近年来越来越困扰着我。

不过，首先我想提出一个略显狭隘的问题。

美国心理学会的角色

如果我们接受运用心理学来解决社会问题这一挑战，那么我们应该期待美国心理学会扮演什么样的角色呢？我提出这个问题，是因为我作为APA官员的经历让我了解到，我们的许多成员都指望他们的全国性组织在确保我们的科学和专业活动具有更大社会相关性方面发挥领导作用。

心理学家在那些签署政治抗议请愿书的人群中有着很好的代表性（Ladd, 1969），他们也没有在自己的全国总部缄默不语。近年来，董事会的会议几乎每次都会收到一份或多份来自关心此事的成员、委员会、理事会、分会或州协会的请愿书，要求就公共事务采取某些行动。这些事务涵盖了从心理测试的正当使用（APA通常对此有话要说）到对特定政治候选人的支持（APA通常不会涉及）等各个方面。

这些要求给协会带来了相当大的压力，因为协会并非为了成为社会行动的工具而创立，对于任何建议它应该成为超越科学和专业组织的东西，它都会犹豫地回应。但它确实会回应。我惊讶地发现 APA 对其成员的任何合理要求都非常重视，对其行动、政策和交流的社会影响也非常敏感。一些成员希望 APA 做得更多，一些则希望做得更少。总的来说，我认为 APA 在其公共事务角色方面相当准确地反映了其成员的普遍共识。

我在此并不打算提出任何曾经困扰董事会和代表委员会的具体公共政策问题，甚至也不打算提供一个决定APA公共角色应该是什么的通用公式。在程序上，我愿意支持公共事务特设委员会的深思熟虑的建议（Tyler, 1969）。

然而，有一个普遍关注的问题，也是与我希望讨论的主题更直接相关的问题，那就是经常听到的论证：APA 应该采取某种行动，因为我们章程的第一条规定协会的目标是促进人类福祉，这一目标在我们的《心理学家伦理标准》声明中也有所体现。

这个论证通常由那些建议 APA 应该公开倡导某种特定社会改革的人提出。当这些建议是恰当的时候，相应的行动就会被采纳——必要的信件会被写出，公开声明会发布给媒体等等。但并非每个建议都是可接受的。我的印象是，问题与我们成员的科学和专业利益关系越不密切，在讨论过程中援引促进人类福祉的可能性就越大。

在大多数情况下，这个论证并没有说服我；我将我的怀疑态度归因于两个方面。

首先，即使是对福利经济学最粗浅的研究也会表明，人类福祉从未在操作层面上被定义为一个社会概念。如果在一般意义上存在人类福祉这样的东西，那它必须是某种加权平均值。在困难的情况下，也就是最可能出现分歧的地方，促进一个群体福祉的东西可能会损害另一个群体。问题在于决定我们希望促进谁的福祉。当然，APA致力于促进心理学家的福祉，但我们不敢盲目地假设对心理学有益的东西总是对人类有益。

对人类福祉的模糊呼吁很少能回答具体问题，因为我们很少有足够的信息来决定哪些行动会产生预期的结果。即使我们确实有足够的智慧预先知道哪些行动最有效地促进人类福祉，我们仍然面临这样的伦理问题：这些行动在道德上是否是被允许的。

因此，我不信任对人类福祉呼吁的第一个原因是，它们在澄清做出困难决定的逻辑、信息或伦理基础方面作用甚微。仅仅真诚地声明我们的心是好的是不够的。

我的第二个原因与这个短语通常被断章取义的事实有关。因此，冒着失去你们注意力的风险，我想完整地陈述我们章程的第一条：

美国心理学会的目标应该是通过以最广泛和最自由的方式鼓励心理学的所有分支，通过促进心理学研究和改善研究方法与条件，通过高标准的职业伦理、行为、教育和成就来改善心理学家的资格和有用性，通过会议、专业接触、报告、论文、讨论和出版物来增加和传播心理学知识，从而推进心理学作为一门科学和作为促进人类福祉的手段，由此推进科学兴趣和探究，以及将研究发现应用于促进公共福祉[APA, 1968, xiii]。

据我对第一条的理解，我们的公司目标是促进心理学。我们通过相信心理学可以用于公共利益来证明这一目标的正当性。我不认为第一条是对支持社会行动或立场的一般许可，无论这些行动或立场在其他方面多么有价值，只要它们不能推进心理学作为一门科学和作为促进人类福祉的手段。当然，APA是我们自己的创造物；我们可以随意改变我们的章程。然而，按照目前的构想，APA并没有为每一个出现的好事业进行干预的许可证。

APA可以做许多有社会价值的事情，也已经做了许多。如果你们的官员并不总是显得渴望创新，急于重塑APA以应对每一个新的社会问题，他们确实在我们章程范围内对建设性变化持开放态度。我相信他们反映了大部分成员的意愿，我觉得没有必要为已经完成的事情道歉。APA一直在做其成员想要做的事情，而且做得相当好。

当然，成员们在这些问题上远非一致。例如，近年来一直存在着关于个体心理学家在发起社会改革中应该扮演什么适当角色的持续辩论。我们在心理学家是否应该保持专家顾问的角色，还是应该在决定公共政策方面承担更积极的参与责任这一问题上存在分歧。顾问被期望总结赞成和反对的论据，但将政策决定留给他人；参与者则希望自己做出政策决定。

那些支持个体心理学家更积极参与的人倾向于认为APA也应该直接参与倡导特定的社会政策。然而，整个这场辩论似乎预设了社会改革只能作为政府或工业界政策决定的结果而发生。这种预设不应该不受挑战。也许我们促进人类福祉的选择比这场辩论所暗示的更加广泛。

是 E. G. Boring 首先让我印象深刻地认识到区分大写 P 的 Psychology 和小写 p 的psychology 的重要性。大写 P 的 Psychology 指的是我们的协会、系所、实验室等等。小写 p 的 psychology 指的是学科本身。大写 P 的 Psychology 在促进人类福祉方面能做的很少，除了忠实地促进小写 p 的 psychology。我们不应该因为不耐烦或判断错误而试图在只有小写 p 的 psychology 才能成功的地方使用大写 P 的Psychology。让我们务必尽一切可能促进人类福祉，但让我们不要忘记，我们在这一事业中的真正力量将来自我们的科学知识，而不是来自我们的全国协会。

在我看来，我们的协会在促进社会变革方面永远只能扮演支持性角色。我并不因此得出结论认为APA已经变得无关紧要或无用，或者更糟的是，它已经默认支持了一个主持我们社会中健康、财富和智慧不公平分配的政治官僚体系。APA没有改革社会这一事实并不意味着它赞同现状；它仅仅意味着这样一个协会能做的相对较少。当人们考虑到人类面临问题的规模和紧迫性时，APA采取什么立场的问题毕竟是一个次要问题。

在我看来，重要的问题不是APA在做什么，而是心理学家们在做什么。Psychology作为一个协会能做什么直接取决于psychology作为一门科学所提供的基础。正是我们的科学为我们提供了促进人类福祉的真正手段。

所以现在让我转向我话题的更广泛方面。

心理学的革命潜力

我将首先公开陈述一些我认为心理学家都感受到、但很少谈论的东西。在我看来，科学心理学是人类心智所构想的最具革命性潜力的智识事业之一。如果我们在朝向既定目标——理解、预测和控制心理与行为现象——方面取得实质性进展，那么对社会各个方面的影响将会让勇敢的人都为之战栗。

心理学的负责任发言人很少强调这种革命性可能。一个原因是公众太容易相信这一点，而对心理学的公众阻力也太容易被动员起来。面对革命性宣言可能很容易弊大于利的可能性，一个谨慎的发言人会找到其他鼓点来行进。

无论我们是否同意谨慎总是最佳策略，我相信我们公开谦逊还有另一个原因。任何声称心理学是革命性事业的人都将面临来自科学同事的要求：要么拿出证据，要么闭嘴。他们会说，到目前为止心理学所做的一切都不是很革命性的。他们会承认心理测量、精神分析、条件反射、感觉阈限、植入电极和因子分析都相当令人钦佩，但在对社会的革命性后果方面，它们很难与火药、蒸汽机、有机化学、无线电话、计算机、原子弹或基因手术相提并论。我们热情的发言人将不得不在困惑的尴尬中退场。

既然我知道关于心理学革命潜力的鲁莽陈述可能导致公众拒绝和科学嘲笑，为什么我要在这个场合冒这样的风险呢？我的理由是，我不相信心理学革命仍然是空中楼阁。它已经开始了。

心理学革命不那么明显的一个原因可能是我们一直在错误的地方寻找它。我们假设心理学应该提供新的技术选择，心理学革命要等到某个权威人士运用这些选择来实现社会期望的目标时才会发生。这种假设的一个原因，也许是因为它遵循了我们从以往科学应用于实际问题中继承的模式。应用科学家应该提供改造环境的工具——这些工具然后可以在公共监管下被富有和强大的利益集团用来实现某些目标。心理学革命到来时，可能会遵循一个非常不同的路径，至少在其初始阶段是这样。

戴维斯（1960）用以下方式解释了应用社会科学与应用自然科学之间的区别：

按定义，应用科学是工具性的。当人类目标被给定时，它通过寻找什么有效手段可以按要求的方式被操控来寻求解决方案。它的功能是满足人类的欲望和需要；否则没人会费心。但当科学关注的是人类——不仅仅作为有机体，而是作为寻求目标的个体和群体成员——那么它就不能以这种方式成为工具性的，因为观察对象对正在发生的事情有发言权，最重要的是，不愿意被当作纯粹的工具来对待。大多数所谓的社会问题之所以成为问题，是因为人们想要某些东西，或者因为存在欲望或利益的冲突[第26页]。

戴维斯继续论证，一旦利益冲突发展起来，应用社会科学就无能为力了；只有当人们在目标上达成一致时，我们的信息才能得到有用的应用。

虽然我同意戴维斯的观点，即行为科学和社会科学不能像物理和生物科学应用于物体和有机体那样应用于人和机构，但我不同意他认为我们在面对冲突时必须保持无能的观点。我们对冲突的预防和解决了解很多，这些信息当然可以得到比现在更好的利用。实际上，有时需要的不是解决冲突而是促进冲突，比如当既得利益威胁到没有组织身份的公众群体时。而在那里，我们又对创造适当的选民群体来维护他们的共同利益了解很多。行为科学家和社会科学家在这种情况下远非无助。

然而，更重要的是，我相信心理学的真正影响将不是通过它放在强权者手中的技术产品来感受到，而是通过它对广大公众的影响，通过一种关于什么是人类可能的和什么是人类期望的新的、不同的公众概念来感受到。

我相信，心理学知识对人类问题的任何广泛而成功的应用都必然涉及我们对自己以及我们如何生活、爱和共同工作的概念的改变。我们不是在发明某种改造环境的新技术，或者某种让社会以任何可能的方式适应的新产品，而是在提议干预适应过程本身。这样的创新与"技术修复"截然不同。我看不出有什么理由相信科学革命的传统模式应该是合适的。

例如，考虑一下弗洛伊德心理学已经对西方社会产生的影响。显然，它的影响虽然局限于社会的某些群体，但却是深刻的，然而我不相信人们可以论证这些影响是通过为实现社会一致同意的目标提供新工具而实现的。作为一种治疗方法，精神分析即使对那些负担得起的人来说成功也有限。作为一种调查方法，它可能更成功一些，但即使在那里，它也只是几种可用方法中的一种。弗洛伊德思想的影响远不是由于他提供的工具，而是由于他所激发的我们对自己的改变了的概念。弗洛伊德为专业心理学家开辟的更广泛的心理学问题范围只是他贡献的一部分。在历史的尺度上更重要的是他对更广泛的知识界的影响，并通过它对广大公众的影响。

今天我们对人性的非理性成分更加敏感，更能够接受我们无意识冲动的现实。弗洛伊德心理学的重要性远不是来自其科学有效性，而是来自它对我们共享的人类形象本身所产生的影响。

我意识到人们可能会论证，在科学知识进步冲击下人类自我概念的改变既不新颖也不革命。例如，达尔文的理论改变了我们对自己的概念，但直到过去十年才有可能发起一场真正基于生物科学的科学革命。人们可能会论证我们现在只是处于心理学的达尔文阶段，真正的心理学革命还在一个世纪或更久的未来。然而，我不认为这个类比是合适的。

发现我们不在宇宙的中心，或者我们的远古祖先生活在树上，确实改变了我们对人类和社会的概念，但这样的新概念对我们在日常事务和制度环境中的行为方式几乎没有影响。然而，基于心理学的人类新概念将对我们社会和个人生活的最私密细节产生直接影响。这一事实在工业革命的任何早期阶段都是前所未有的。

心理学革命的核心将是一个关于人作为个体和社会生物的新的、科学基础的概念。当我说心理学革命已经降临我们时，我的意思是我们已经开始改变人类的自我概念。如果我们想要推进这场革命，我们不仅必须加强其科学基础，还必须努力将其传达给我们的学生和公众。应该利用它的不是实业家或政治家，而是每个人，每一天。

科学心理学对公众心理学的丰富构成了我们科学应用于促进人类福祉的最直接和最重要的方式。因此，我们不应该试图预见可能破坏我们现有社会安排的新心理学产品，而应该自觉地分析我们的科学心理学可能对大众心理学产生的总体影响。当我试图为自己进行这种分析时，我必须承认我对结果并不完全满意。

现在我想简要考虑一下我们正在产生的一些影响，以及在我看来，我们的影响目前正在引向何方。让我从许多科学心理学家试图向公众传达的一个主要信息的简要概述开始。

行为控制

现代心理学最受推崇的真理之一是，某些刺激可以强化产生这些刺激的行为。这个熟悉原理的实际意义在于，如果你能控制这些强化刺激的出现，那么你就能控制旨在获得或避免这些刺激的适应性行为的出现。这种行为与其后果之间的偶然性关系已经在许多动物行为研究中得到证实，在这些研究中环境条件可以被控制，或至少可以被明确规定，结果可以被精确测量。

对人类这种动物来说，类似的情况当然也成立，尽管由于人类的符号倾向以及当被试也是人时实验者与被试之间差异的改变而变得复杂。在人与人之间，强化通常是一种相互关系，每个人都在某种程度上控制着他人。这种相互强化的关系，人类的符号天赋已经用金钱或金钱承诺的形式将其普遍化，为我们的交换经济系统提供了心理学基础。当然，心理学家并没有创造这个控制行为的经济系统。我们试图做的是用足够普遍的术语来描述其心理学基础和局限性，使其适用于不同物种，并建议如何将这种技术扩展到教育、康复、治疗，甚至政治情境中，在这些情境中经济奖励和惩罚通常是不合适的。一旦行为控制问题用这些术语表述出来，我们就可以尝试发现最有效的强化时间表。

我现在的关注与这些想法的有效性无关。我关注的是它们对广大公众的影响，因为如果我是对的，那就是我们最可能实现心理学革命的地方。

我怀疑，在公众看来，所有这些关于控制行为的讨论都令人不快，如果不是实际上具有威胁性的话。弗洛伊德已经在公众心中建立了一个普遍信念，即所有行为都是有动机的。当前的信息说心理学家现在知道如何利用这种动机来控制人们将要做什么。当他们听到这些时，当然，我们的科学同事可能会指责我们做出伪科学声明；公众中不那么科学的群体可能会对他们所感知到的对个人自由的威胁感到愤怒。这两种反应都不完全公正，但也都不完全不合理。

我相信这些批评者看到了一个重要真理，一个对行为控制技术的近视专注可能使我们忽视的真理。充其量，控制只是任何个人改善或社会改革计划中的一个组成部分。在没有任何关于行为应该如何改变的连贯计划的情况下，改变行为是毫无意义的。公众想要了解的是我们使用控制的计划。我担心，心理学家太经常暗示行为控制的可接受用途要么是不言而喻的，要么可以安全地留给强权者的智慧和仁慈。心理学家不能如此轻易地放弃规划功能。行为控制的人道应用必须基于对我们试图解决的个人和社会问题的智能诊断。心理学在诊断个人和社会问题方面至少有同样多的，可能更多的贡献，就像它在行为控制方面的贡献一样。

无论我们是否真正获得了对人类有效的新的科学行为控制技术，无论在缺乏诊断和使用规划的情况下控制是否有任何价值，如此多的心理学家不断谈论控制这一简单事实正在对公众心理学产生影响。普通公民倾向于相信它。控制一直是其他科学的实际回报。控制也必须是心理学家所追求的。此外，由于科学是出了名的成功，行为控制必须是不可避免的。因此外行人形成了这样的印象：控制是我们正在走的路的名称，专家们只是在争论我们在这条路上走了多远。

与这种对控制的强调密切相关的是经常重复的声明，即生物体只不过是机器。当然，科学家认识到，这个声明对我们快速发展的机器概念说得比对生物体说得多，但当信息传达到公众耳中时，这种解释通常会丢失。公众对机器的概念是像汽车这样的东西，一个由操作者控制的机械装置。如果人是机器，他们就可以像汽车一样被驾驶。这个类比当然是荒谬的，但它说明了可能发生的那种扭曲。

如果行为控制在某种精确科学意义上是可行的这一假设在公众心理学中牢固扎根，它可能会产生不幸的后果，特别是如果它与控制应该由工业或官僚精英行使的假设相结合。心理学家必须始终尊重和倡导人身保护令的原则——一个人拥有自己思想的权利（桑福德，1955）。如果我们真的有一种控制人类行为的新科学方法，让它落入一小群人手中将是极不道德的，即使他们是心理学家。

也许一个历史类比是合适的。当物种进化在生物学中是一个新颖而令人兴奋的想法时，各种社会理论家接受了它并将其解释为意味着资本主义竞争，就像物种之间的竞争一样，是所有进步的源泉，所以新实业家的巨大财富是适者生存法则的科学必然后果。这个论证，被称为"社会达尔文主义"，产生了不幸的后果，对社会科学和整个社会都是如此（霍夫施塔特，1944）。

如果现在接受这样的观念，即实业家或官僚必须被允许对人拥有与实验者对其实验动物相同的控制权是强化法则的科学必然后果，我担心类似的不可容忍剥削时期可能会随之而来——如果说它还没有开始的话。

伴随行为控制科学的危险已经被多次指出。科学地研究动机的心理学家通常对这种广泛存在的担心他们可能成功的忧虑感到困惑。控制不是心理学家发明的东西。每个人都在"被控制"，总是被这样或那样的东西控制着。我们所想要的只是发现控制是如何运作的。一旦我们理解了这一点，社会就可以以任何看起来对社会有利的方式使用这些知识。另一方面，我们的批评者想知道谁将诊断我们的问题，谁将设定我们的社会目标，谁将管理奖励和惩罚。

我试图添加到这个熟悉对话中的只是这样的观察：所涉及的社会危险不需要等待科学事业的成功。行为控制很容易成为一个自我实现的预言。如果人们普遍开始相信行为的科学控制，强制性社会计划的支持者肯定会通过给他们的提议穿上科学外衣来利用这种信念。如果我们对人性的新公众概念是人的行为可以被那些掌权者科学地控制，政府将迅速符合这种概念。因此，当我试图辨别我们的心理学革命一直在采取什么方向时，它的某些方面深深地困扰着我，并让我质疑从长远来看这些发展是否真的会促进人类福祉。

这是一个严重的指控。如果其中有任何真理，我们应该问是否还有其他方法向我们开放。

就我个人而言，我相信有更好的方式来宣传心理学并将其与社会问题联系起来。强化只是我们必须提供的许多重要想法中的一个。我不愿意不断重复强化导致控制，而更愿意强调强化可以导致满足和能力。我更愿意将理解和预测作为我们的主要科学目标。

因此，在剩余的篇幅中，我想试图论证理解和预测是比控制更好的心理学目标——对心理学和促进人类福祉都更好，因为它们引导我们思考的不是强权精英的强制，而是问题的诊断和能够丰富每个公民生活的计划的发展。

公众心理学：两种范式

现在应该很明显，我在心中某处有两种关于在心理学科学进步冲击下人性的大众概念可能变成什么样的替代形象。其中一种形象是不幸的，甚至是威胁性的；另一种更模糊，但充满希望。让我试图使这些想法更具体。

第一种形象就是我一直在描述的。它对威权主义思想有很大吸引力，与我们基于强制、惩罚和报复的传统竞争意识形态很好地契合。它代表了对科学心理学的严重扭曲这一事实正是我的观点。在我看来，我们犯了一个错误，试图将我们的想法应用于社会问题，并在这种意识形态框架内获得对我们科学的接受。

第二种形象建立在相同的心理学基础上，但更准确地反映了它；它不允许与我们传统社会意识形态的任何妥协。模糊但乐观地假设，这种意识形态可以被修改，以便更容易接受对人性的更真实概念。如何实现这种修改是我们面临的问题之一；我相信如果我们继续将通过强化控制行为宣传为我们对社会问题解决方案的主要贡献，这种修改将不会实现。我不想给任何人留下我已经制定了一个明确定义的社会替代方案的印象，但我至少想开启一个讨论并提出一些建议。

我的两种形象与麦格雷戈（1960）曾经称为X理论和Y理论的并没有太大不同。X理论是传统理论，认为因为人们不喜欢工作，他们必须被强制、控制、指导，并受到惩罚威胁，然后他们才会去做。人们容忍被指导，许多人甚至更喜欢它，因为他们没有什么雄心，想要避免责任。麦格雷戈基于社会科学的替代Y理论认为，工作就像游戏或休息一样自然。外部控制和威胁不是激励人们工作的唯一手段。人们将在服务于他们所承诺的目标时行使自我指导和自我控制；他们的承诺是与实现目标相关的奖励的函数。人们不仅可以学会接受，还可以寻求责任。想象力、独创性和创造力在人群中广泛分布，尽管这些智力潜能在现代工业生活条件下利用不足。

麦格雷戈的 X 理论和 Y 理论是在他对工业管理研究的背景下发展起来的。它们是工业管理者关于如何最好地实现其机构目标所持有的竞争理论。如果我们要谈论一般的公众心理学，而不仅仅是公众心理学的管理表现，就需要一个更广阔的视野。所以让我通过引用瓦雷拉的想法来扩展麦格雷戈的区别，瓦雷拉是乌拉圭蒙得维的亚一位非常杰出的工程师，他在解决广泛的个人和社会问题中使用科学心理学。

瓦雷拉（1970，印刷中）对比了关于人的社会本性的两种概念。遵循库恩（1962）对科学革命的讨论，他将这两种概念称为"范式"。第一种范式是我们社会制度目前所基于的一套假设。第二种是基于心理学研究的对比范式。让我非常简要地为你们概述它们。

我们当前的社会范式特征如下：人人生而平等。大多数行为由经济竞争驱动，冲突是不可避免的。一个真理潜藏在所有争议之下，不合理最好用事实和逻辑来对抗。当出现问题时，有人要承担责任，必须尽一切努力确定他的罪责，以便可以惩罚他。有罪的人对自己的不当行为和自己的康复负责。他的老师和监督者太忙，无法成为社会科学专家；他们的角色是设计解决方案并确保他们的学生或下属按照他们被告知的去做。

为了比较，瓦雷拉提供了一个基于心理学研究的范式：人们在能力和个性方面存在巨大的个体差异。人类动机是复杂的，没有人因为任何单一原因而行动，但总的来说，积极激励比威胁或惩罚更有效。冲突并不比疾病更不可避免，可以被解决或，更好的是，被预防。解决社会问题的时间和资源是严格有限的。当出现问题时，一个人如何感知情况对他来说比"真实事实"更重要，在他的非理性情感平静下来之前，他无法对情况进行推理。社会问题通过纠正原因而不是症状来解决，这在群体中比个别地更有效地完成。老师和监督者必须是社会科学专家，因为他们对学生或下属的合作和个人改善负责。

毫无疑问，其他心理学家会以某种不同的方式描绘这幅图画。当然，在不回顾这种概括所基于的心理学证据的情况下，我无法论证它们的有效性。但我认为你们大多数人会认识到麦格雷戈的Y理论和瓦雷拉的第二种范式所基于的研究路线。此外，这些基于心理学的范式在几个方面与我们社会的主流意识形态不兼容。

那么，这里就是真正的挑战：我们如何培养一种社会氛围，在其中某种基于心理学的这样的新的人类公众概念可以扎根和繁荣？在我看来，这是我们更熟悉的关于心理学如何可能有助于促进人类福祉问题的恰当翻译。

我不能假装对这个问题有答案，即使在其翻译形式中，但我相信答案的一部分是心理学必须由非心理学家来实践。我们不是医生；我们行业的秘密不需要为高度训练的专家保留。心理学事实应该自由地传递给所有需要和能够使用它们的人。从心理学原理的成功应用中，公众可能会更好地欣赏从我们科学中涌现的人类新概念的力量。

如果我们认真对待基于人性新概念的和平革命想法，我们的科学结果将必须以实用和可用的形式灌输到公众意识中，以便我们所知道的可以被普通人应用。即使包括非专业人员在内，心理学家也根本不够满足对心理学服务的每一个需求。广大人民将不得不成为他们自己的心理学家，并对我们建立的原理进行自己的应用。

当然，每个人都实践心理学，就像每个做饭的人都是化学家，每个看钟的人都是天文学家，每个开车的人都是工程师一样。当我说非心理学家必须实践心理学时，我并不是在建议任何激进的偏离。我只是建议我们应该教他们更好地实践它，自觉地利用我们认为是科学有效的原理。

我们的责任不是承担专家角色并试图自己应用心理学，而是将其给予真正需要它的人——这包括每个人。非心理学家对有效心理学的实践将不可避免地改变人们对自己和他们能做什么的概念。当我们完成这一点时，我们将真正引起一场心理学革命。

如何给予心理学

我深刻意识到，给予心理学绝非简单任务。在我们的社会中，对心理学创新的阻力之深，必须亲身经历才能相信（格拉齐亚诺，1969）。

解决社会问题通常被认为比解决科学问题更困难。社会问题通常涉及更多的独立变量，而且在社会被说服采纳解决方案之前，它无法得到最终解决。许多试图将合理的心理学实践引入学校、诊所、医院、监狱或工业的人被迫沮丧地撤退。他们抱怨，而且有充分理由，他们无法对抗"体制"，他们的反应往往比理智更激烈。他们说，体制拒绝改变，即使它不起作用。

这种经验如此普遍，以至于在我悲观的时刻，我被引导去怀疑是否除了彻底改革之外，任何事情都是可能的。

多伊奇（1969）提出了一个有趣的观点，即竞争性和合作性社会关系往往是相互排斥的。他用以下术语总结了大量研究的结果：

权力策略和强制、威胁、欺骗的战术源于竞争关系，也导致竞争关系。同样，相互解决问题的策略和说服、开放、相互增进的战术引发合作导向，也被合作导向所引发 [第4页]。

每种导向都有其自身的内在一致性；一种的元素不容易注入另一种。

也许类似的内在一致性压力是公众对我们许多创新建议抵制的根源。经常看起来我们的任何一个想法单独来看都是不够的。注入现有的社会范式中，它要么是异物，与塑造我们社会制度的其他预设不兼容，要么被扭曲和琐碎化以适应预先存在的范式。

所有社会科学中最基本的想法之一是文化概念。社会人类学家已经发展出一种文化作为有机整体的概念，其中每个特定的价值、实践或假设都必须在总体系统的背景下理解。他们讲述关于在不理解将被打破的社会平衡的情况下将西方改革引入原住民文化后果的可怕故事。

也许文化完整性不限于原始文化，也适用于我们此时此地的社会。如果是这样，那么我们零碎创新的尝试可能注定要么失败，要么被彻底拒绝。

我将这些想法标记为悲观的，因为它们暗示需要在整个系统中进行剧烈变化，这些变化只能由对他人生活拥有危险权力的人强加。而我已经论证过，这不是我们心理学革命应该进行的方式。

然而，在我更乐观的时刻，我认识到你不需要对社会组织拥有完全权威来改革它。重要的不是控制系统，而是理解它。对系统整体有有效概念的人通常可以引入相对较小的变化，这些变化在整个组织中产生广泛后果。缺乏这样的概念，有价值的创新可能完全失败。

例如，如果你在退伍军人医院的精神科病房建立奖惩制度，当美国退伍军人协会以你不能从退伍军人那里扣留食物和衣服为理由反对时，你不应该愤怒。如果你对医院作为社会系统有更充分的理解，你会在问题诊断中包括美国退伍军人协会的利益和影响，你会制定一个获得他们认可的计划，作为你作为社会工程师任务的一部分。你不应该仅仅因为你对问题做了不充分的诊断就要求过度的权力。理解必须首先到来。

在我乐观的时刻，我能够说服自己理解是可以达到的，社会科学已经处于成功应用可能的阶段。基于我们已经知道的谨慎诊断和精明规划通常可以解决乍看之下似乎无法克服的问题。许多社会、临床和工业心理学家已经证明了基于合理心理学原理的诊断和规划的力量。

瓦雷拉通过他在乌拉圭的工作说明了这样的应用。诊断不仅涉及对社会组织以及所有卷入问题的人的感知和目标的详细分析，还包括对他们能力和个性的描述。规划涉及明确制定一系列步骤，这些步骤将引导这些人一起考虑问题，并帮助他们发现尊重每个人希望和愿望的解决方案。如果在这个计划过程中，有必要说服某人，这不是通过强制或列举事实来完成，而是通过一个渐进的、逐步的过程，使他能够在说服自己替代观点的优点并扩大他对可接受解决方案范围的概念时，一点一点地减少他的抗拒（津巴多和埃贝森，1969，第114-121页）。这不是地方，我也不是描述瓦雷拉构建和执行这样计划的独创性的人，但这样的应用给了我一些乐观的理由。

诊断实际问题和制定处理它们的详细计划可能比解决科学问题更困难，也可能不是，但它肯定是不同的。许多在经验主义、实验传统中训练的心理学家试图同时服务于两个主人。也就是说，他们试图解决实际问题，同时收集关于他们干预效果的科学价值数据。然而，其他领域在科学家和工程师之间保持更公平的分工。科学家负责原理的有效性；工程师接受它们并试图用它们来解决实际问题。

虽然我认识到评估工程师产品的重要性，但在这个领域这不是容易做到的事情。评估社会创新本身就是一门艺术，我们才刚刚开始发展。经济考虑当然是相关的，但我们也必须学会评估我们新解决方案的更微妙的心理和社会含义（鲍尔，1960）。在这种意义上的技术评估不会通过坚持每项改革都应该像设计良好的实验来实现。特别是，评估的需要不应该被允许阻碍那些享受并有社会工程天赋的人。

我们严重需要更多能够将我们的科学应用于广大公众个人和社会问题的心理学技术专家，因为正是通过他们，公众最终会发现心理学家正在发展的新范式。也就是说，正是通过这种实际应用的成功，我们有了革命化公众心理学的最好希望。

显然，我们必须避免肤浅的弊病；我们必须作为科学家继续完善、澄清和整合我们的新范式。最重要的是，我们必须自觉地认识到我们正在努力的是一个新的革命性概念，以便孤立的发现可以与那个更大的背景相关联并在其中得到评估。但如果广大公众不接受它，或者公众心理学不被它改变，所有这些当然都是徒劳的。

我心中的变化没有立法的可能性。通过法律要求人们必须改变他们对自己和他人的概念，正是我们需要的相反。教育似乎是我们唯一的可能性。我不仅仅指教室里的教育，尽管那可能是我们目前可支配的最好的沟通渠道。我心中有一个更雄心勃勃的教育广大公众的计划。

塑造这种教育以适应接受它的人们的感知需求是至关重要的。适合研究生研讨会的讲座很少适合外行人，对于面临具体问题的外行人来说，它们通常比无用更糟。为了让工厂监督员或贫民窟母亲参与进来，我们必须给他们一些他们可以使用的东西。抽象理论，无论多么优雅，或敏感性训练，无论多么有洞察力，都与他们面临的具体困难太遥远。

为了开始，我们必须从人们所在的地方开始，而不是假设我们知道他们应该在哪里。如果监督员与他的手下有麻烦，也许我们应该教他如何写工作描述，如何评估填补工作的人的能力和个性；也许我们应该教他说服的艺术，或积极强化的时间和地点。

如果贫民窟母亲没有给她的孩子足够的智力挑战，也许我们应该教她如何鼓励他们的运动、感知和语言技能。所涉及的技术不是必须为拥有心理学博士学位的人保留的某种深奥的巫术分支。当想法变得足够具体和明确时，心理学的科学基础可以被六年级儿童掌握。

我们可以提出许多明显和有用的建议，非心理学家可以利用。不是每个人类工程中的心理学问题都必须由专业心理学家解决；工程师可以迅速吸收与他们自己工作相关的心理学事实和理论。不是每个教学计划都必须由学习理论家编写；控制程序化材料设计和评估的原理可以由内容专家学习。不是每个人事决定都必须由心理测量师做出；不是每个面试都必须由临床心理学家进行；不是每个问题都必须由认知心理学家解决；不是每个强化都必须由条件反射学生监督。心理学原理和技术可以被每个人有用地应用。如果我们的建议真的有效，人们应该渴望学习更多。如果它们不起作用，我们应该改进它们。但我们不应该试图给人们一些他们无法认识其价值的东西，然后在他们不回来参加第二次会议时抱怨。

以阅读教学为例。这里显然是应用心理学原理的合适领域。那么我们做什么？我们召集专家，他们决定孩子们知道什么词，以及他们应该以什么顺序学习阅读它们；然后我们用这些词写故事，老师让孩子们阅读它们，或者我们在利用强化原理的程序化教学中使用它们。但太经常的是，孩子们无法认识到学习这些精心构建课程的价值。

就我个人而言，我对阿什顿-华纳（1963）的方法印象深刻，她首先问孩子他想要什么词。妈妈、爸爸、吻、害怕、鬼魂、他们自己的名字——这些是孩子们要求的词，与他们自己的爱和恐惧紧密相关的词。她把每个孩子的词写在一张大而结实的卡片上并给他。如果孩子想要警察、屠夫、刀、杀、监狱和炸弹这样的词，他就得到它们。他几乎立即学会阅读它们。这是他的词，每天早上他从老师每晚收集的堆中取回自己的词。这些不是专家选择的死词，而是在孩子自己经验中活着的词。有了这个开始，孩子们开始写作，使用他们自己的词，从那里阅读教学自然地跟随。在这种制度下，一个词不是用从某个外部动机源借来的强化来学习的强加任务。学习这个词本身就是强化的；它给孩子他想要的东西，一种应对欲望或恐惧的新方式。每个孩子决定他想从哪里开始，每个孩子接受一些他能认识其价值的东西。

我们能推广这个由新西兰小学校一位有灵感的老师发现的技术吗？在我自己的思考中，我将它与怀特（1959）称为能力动机的东西联系起来。为了利用这个动机系统，我们必须使用心理学给人们技能，这些技能将满足他们感觉更有效的冲动。感觉有效是非常个人的事情，因为它必须是在应对个人生活中个人问题方面有效的感觉。从那个开始，一些人可能想了解更多关于帮助他们增加能力的科学，然后也许我们能够承受更抽象。但在开始时，我们必须尝试诊断和解决人们认为他们有的问题，而不是我们专家认为他们应该有的问题，我们必须学会在定义这些问题的社会和制度背景中理解这些问题。用这种方法，我们可能为护士、警察、监狱看守、销售员——为许多不同生活道路上的人做一些实际的事情。我相信，这就是当我们谈论将心理学应用于促进人类福祉时我们应该意味着的。

如果你告诉我这样的计划太雄心勃勃或太不符合我们作为科学家和实践者的自我概念，我必须同意我不知道在哪里放置我们的支点来移动世界。我的目标是说服你这是我们面临的问题，我们不敢把它留给官僚或商人来解决。我们将不得不尽我们所能地应对它，我希望有人对如何做有比我更好的想法。

我可以看到特定亚文化中创新的一些希望。如果我们在特定机构——学校、医院、监狱、工业中应用我们的新范式，我们也许可以测试其有效性并证明其优越性。许多这样的社会实验当然已经在进行中。最近对社区心理学兴趣的激增（贝内特，1966）很大程度上是由于认识到我们确实有东西可以贡献给社区生活而激发的。也许所有这些工作最终会产生累积效应。

当然，一个麻烦是我们试图逆转影响的自然方向。通常，一个机构或社区或多或少自动地按照它所嵌入的更大文化来塑造自己的亚文化，新成员需要很少的灌输就能理解机构所基于的默示假设。新范式是否足够强大以逆转这个方向，我想，在目前是纯粹推测的问题。然而，如果新范式的每个应用都被视为与其他每个应用无关，并且没有尝试将这些实验整合为整个社会的范式，我们似乎不太可能成功。

然而，我们的社会可能不像我们预期的那么抵制。我们作为心理学家一直在表达的对社会相关性的要求只是对我们社会当前状态普遍不满的一个方面。我们到处听到对旧范式的抱怨。人们越来越疏离于一个社会，在这个社会中，少数聪明人在关门后决定什么对每个人都好。

我们基于惩罚和报复的司法系统不起作用。即使是那些最受经济奖励祝福的人也在寻求更令人满意的东西来充实他们的生活。我们迫切需要解决冲突的技术，并防止它们成为无法合理撤退的公开对抗。任何读报纸的人都必须意识到巨大的社会变化正在形成，如果文明社会要生存，它们必须发生。

既得利益当然会反对这些变化，但正如有人曾经说过的，既得利益，无论多么强大，都无法抵挡新想法的逐渐侵蚀。如果我们心理学家准备好了，我们也许能够贡献一个基于心理学科学的连贯和可行的哲学，这将使这种普遍激动不那么消极，将使它成为对新事物的积极寻求。

我认识到你们中的许多人会注意到这些雄心只不过是空洞的修辞。你们会说，心理学家永远不会胜任。我们应该呆在我们的实验室里做我们自己的事情。公众会在没有我们的情况下制定出自己的范式。也许这样的怀疑是有道理的。

另一方面，困难不是投降的借口。在某种意义上，无法达到的是追求的最好目标。所以让我们继续我们的斗争，以推进心理学作为促进人类福祉的手段，每个人以自己的方式。然而，对我自己来说，我无法想象我们能做什么比发现如何最好地给予心理学更与人类福祉相关，没有什么能对下一代心理学家构成更大的挑战。